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Editorial 
‘Keith Stanton and the Law of Professional Negligence’* 
Ken Oliphant, University of Bristol 
 
Introduction 
This issue of the journal takes the form of a Festschrift dedicated to Keith Stanton, professor of law 
at the University of Bristol, a leading light in the recognition and development of the law of 
professional negligence as a distinct legal category, and one of the founding editors of this journal. It 
comprises of revised versions of papers given at the seminar ‘Professional Negligence Law in the 
21st Century’ at the University of Bristol Law School on 17 January 2017. The seminar was the 
second that the journal has sponsored since its acquisition by Bloomsbury Professional in XXXX, the 
first (in 2015) commemorating the 30th anniversary of the journal’s first publication.1 
The extent of Keith’s contribution to the law of professional negligence, tort law more 
widely, and the study of law in university in general, provides more than ample justification for the 
dedication of this special issue to him. He has been a member of the University of Bristol law faculty 
since 1973, serving for nine years over two stints as head of the law school. In 2011–12, he was 
president of the Society of Legal Scholars, the professional body for university law teachers in the 
United Kingdom. His books are indispensable works of reference in the law of tort, including Breach 
of Statutory Duty in Tort (1986), The Modern Law of Tort (1994) and Statutory Torts (co-authored, 
2003). Perhaps preeminent amongst them, and certainly most pertinent for present purposes, is the 
remarkable book, Professional Negligence, that he co-wrote with Tony Dugdale, first appearing in 
1981, with new editions in 1989 and 1998. Together with the identically named title by Rupert 
Jackson and John Powell that was first published in 1982, and now appears in its eight edition as 
Jackson & Powell on Professional Liability, it was a work that defined a new legal category. One 
member of this journal’s editorial board, Mark Simpson QC explained to me: ‘My generation were 
brought up on two books:  Jackson & Powell and Dugdale & Stanton.  We had to get 50 people to 
write the next one.  That shows, I think, what a great achievement those two books were.  We all 
owe Keith a great debt.’2 
This special issue consists of articles by several of Keith’s colleagues at Bristol (Joanne 
Conaghan, Paula Giliker, Judy Laing, Clare Torrible and myself), and by a Bristol alumnus, Imran 
Benson, now a barrister. I had not initially conceived of the collection being such a Bristol dominated 
affair, but so many colleagues were so eager to contribute that I felt I could not deny them the 
opportunity, even if this filled all the available slots for the seminar. In any case, it is not entirely 
inappropriate to celebrate the University of Bristol’s own contribution to the history of the journal, 
as it was two Bristol lecturers, Keith and Tony Dugdale, who were instrumental in establishing it in 
1985 in collaboration with the journal’s first publisher, Frank Cass. The Bristol theme continued in its 
                                                          
*  I am very grateful to Keith Stanton for his generous comments on a previous version of this paper. In the 
interests of transparency, I should confess that he was not at all convinced by my analysis. 
1  See Issue 4 of vol 31 (2015) on ‘Vicarious Liability and Non-Delegable Duties’ (co-ordinated by Paula 
Giliker). 
2  Email to the author, January 2017, referring to M Simpson (ed), Professional Negligence and Liability 
(Informa (previously LLP), looseleaf, first published 2000). 
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first issue, in which three of the five articles published had authors affiliated to the Law School: Della 
Evans, Tony Dugdale and David Feldman. (The other authors were Stephen Todd and Michael Jones, 
who were both also to contribute very significantly to the journal over many years.) Incidentally, in 
that first issue, Keith was the only person listed as editor, though I gather from him that he 
performed that function jointly with Tony Dugdale, with David Allen, Jon Holyoak, Michael Jones and 
John Parkinson as assistant editors. 
The eagle-eyed reader who has already looked at his issue’s table of contents will by now 
have noticed that, somewhat unusually in a collection of this nature, Keith has actually contributed 
an article to his own Festschrift. The explanation is rather simple. I wanted to keep the ulterior 
purpose of the seminar in January a surprise for him, but to ensure his attendance—without rousing 
his suspicions—could think of no way of doing so other than to ask him to contribute to the event. 
When he offered a paper, I could hardly turn such bounty down. In consequence, this collection not 
only stands as a commemoration of Keith’s work, but also provides further evidence of its 
excellence. 
The rest of this editorial introduction will introduce the other papers in this issue and pick 
out some of the broader themes that emerge from them. But not before I take the opportunity to 
honour Keith in typical academic fashion—namely, by subjecting some of his well-known views to 
critical attack. In particular, I want to take issue with his longstanding hostility towards the concept 
of assumption of responsibility as a useful organising idea in the law of professional negligence. To 
do so, I shall need to begin with some elementary explanation of how the law of professional 
negligence is in fact treated as distinct from the general law of negligence and to consider whether 
there is any justification for doing so.  
 
The distinctive legal character of professional negligence 
The law of professional negligence may be regarded as distinct from the general law of negligence in 
a number of respects. The duty of care it imposes on the professional goes beyond what the law 
generally requires insofar as it entails obligations of an affirmative and not merely negative 
character—that is, to confer a positive benefit on the client and not merely to avoid causing harm. 
Exceptionally, this duty extends to the client’s purely economic interests, so the scope of protection 
of the duty is also more extensive than in negligence generally. The law of professional negligence 
also demands a distinct standard of care, higher than that owed by others, based on the express or 
implied undertaking to apply the competence or skill expected of a professional.  
Admittedly, some writers dispute the proposition that professionals are judged against a 
distinct standard of care, higher than that owed by others. To them, there is only one standard—the 
standard of reasonable care;3 it is only its practical content that varies, reflecting the task 
undertaken.4 Yet, there is substantial case authority in favour of a variable standard. An amateur 
carpenter is not to be judged by the higher standard appropriately applied to a professional 
carpenter working for reward.5 A jeweller performing an ear-piercing is judged more leniently than if 
the same procedure were undertaken by a surgeon.6 Even different groups within a single profession 
may be subject to different standards of care: a general medical practitioner conducting an 
examination need not demonstrate the same degree of competence and skill that would be 
                                                          
3  AM Dugdale and KM Stanton, Professional Negligence (3rd edn, 1998), para 5.05. 
4  Ibid, para 5.16. 
5  Wells v Cooper [1958] 2 QB 265 (CA) at 271, per Jenkins LJ. 
6  Philips v Whiteley (William) Ltd [1938] 1 All ER 566, per Goddard J. 
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demanded of a specialist consultant .7 Academic commentary also generally favours this view,8 
though it should be noted that this is not to cast doubt on the proposition that the law of negligence 
sets minimum standards of reasonable conduct applicable to different activities: the point is only 
that the law may impose a higher standard on professionals and others who hold themselves out as 
possessing particular skill, even in respect of activities that need not be performed with such skill by 
others. 
These distinctions between the law of professional negligence and the law of negligence 
generally cannot be explained simply on the basis that the professional’s duty of care is contractual. 
It is well established that the professional’s duty arises concurrently under the contractual retainer 
and in the law of tort. In such a case, the client can choose whichever cause of action is the more 
advantageous (for example, on limitation grounds).9 If there is no contract, the claim in tort assumes 
even greater significance. It may be available where there is no client relationship (for example, 
where information is provided in the interests of another person who is a client)10 or where there is 
no contract with a client because of a lack of consideration (for example, where the professional 
provides services free of charge in the expectation of future remunerative work) .11 The tort remedy 
may also avail third parties, who may be able to bring a claim even though not able to sue on the 
retainer.12  
To the extent that the law of professional negligence is distinctive, that often works to the 
advantage of the client and others able to sue on the professional’s duty of care. But it can also cut 
the other way, as the professional may be afforded a protection from liability that is not available to 
the world at large. As is well known, the Bolam test entails a degree of judicial deference to 
professional standards, meaning that compliance with even a minority practice is not to be regarded 
as negligent provided it is founded on a responsible body of professional opinion that has a logical 
basis.13 It is immaterial that the court has a preference for a different body of opinion.14  
 
Justifying distinct rules of professional negligence 
Why special liability rules are applied to professionals is not self-evident and requires justification. 
Perhaps surprisingly, this is not a matter that has so far generated a substantial literature.15 
Part of the rationale for treating professional negligence as distinct may be found in how 
professional status is defined. Though some legal writers treat it as ‘self-evident’ what is a profession 
and what is not,16 others seek to identify typical traits, characteristics or hallmarks of 
professionalism. Thus, one leading practitioners’ work highlights the following: the skilled and 
specialised nature of professional work; the moral commitment of practitioners to high standards 
                                                          
7  Cf Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634 (HL) at 638, per Lord Scarman 
(‘a doctor who professes to exercise a special skill must exercise the ordinary skill of his speciality’). 
8  See eg P Giliker, Torts (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) § 5-022; WE Peel & J Goudkamp, Winfield and 
Jolowicz on Tort (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) § 6-011; and note also, in the very first issue of this 
journal, Holyoak ‘Standard of care—Thrice more unto the breach’ (1985) 1 PN 33. 
9  Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1) [1995] 2 AC 145. 
10  Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
11  Burgess v Lejonvarn [2017] EWCA Civ 254. 
12  See eg White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207. 
13  Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, as interpreted in Bolitho v City and 
Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 (HL). 
14  Maynard, supra n 7 at 638, per Lord Scarman. 
15  But see Jackson LJ ‘The Professions: Power, Privilege and Legal Liability’ (2015) 31 PN 122. 
16  Ibid at 123, commenting on the approach in Dugdale and Stanton (supra n 3). 
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and their duty to the public at large, not just their client; the role of professional associations in 
regulating admission to the profession and upholding standards; and the high status accorded to 
professionals, involving privileges granted by Parliament or by common consent.17 Sociologists have 
produced comparable lists.18 Yet it is not clear that all these considerations bear normative 
significance in the present context—that is, that they provide or contribute to a justification for the 
application to professionals of rules of negligence liability distinct from those that are generally 
applicable.19 
 It is proposed here that two countervailing considerations have played the largest role in the 
development of a distinct law of professional negligence. On the one hand, the assumption of 
professional status constitutes an invitation to persons generally to place trust in the application for 
their benefit of the special competence and skill that the profession claims to possess. Professional 
status is a socially useful institution that facilitates access to expert advice and opinion for those that 
desire to have it. It serves as a ‘kite mark’ of quality and signals an ethical commitment that 
overrides the economic self-interest inherent in normal commercial transactions. By recognising 
professional status and according specific consequences to it, the law supports the institution and 
encourages trust in it. Those who rely on the institution are, for that reason, prima facie entitled to 
the law’s assistance in the provision of suitable remedies if they suffer detriment because the 
professional service is negligently performed.20 
On the other hand, professional status also involves the claim to a set of particular 
privileges, traditionally including self-regulation and monopoly rights over the provision of certain 
services. The aforementioned Bolam test can be seen in this light as signalling judicial deference to 
the ability of the professions to set their own standards of proper conduct. Yet it is also possible to 
see the set of professional privileges as providing a further reason for recognising a liability on 
professionals that is distinct in a variety of respects from the ordinary liability for negligence: it is fair 
to enforce the responsibility assumed by the professional through the application of liability rules as 
the quid pro quo for the privileges from which the professional benefits. 
 
The legal concept of assumption of responsibility 
Insofar as the invocation of professional status provides a justification for the imposition on 
professionals of distinct liabilities, the legal mechanism for doing so is the concept of assumption of 
responsibility. This provides a legal basis not only for the higher standard of care owed by 
professional persons but also for the wider scope of their duty of care (specifically, insofar as it 
protects purely financial interests) and its affirmative content. Under the law of non-delegable 
duties, the assumption of responsibility may also entail a duty to ensure that tasks undertaken for 
                                                          
17  Jackson & Powell on Professional Liability (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) para 1-005. See also McGrath 
‘Professional Liability’ in Oliphant, K (ed) The Law of Tort (3rd edn, LexisNexis, 2015) para 16.1. 
18  See eg TJ Johnson Professions and Power (Macmillan, 1972) 23–32, discussing ‘trait’ models of 
professionalism, which he contrasts with ‘functionalist’ models. 
19  In other contexts, of course, other factors may be relevant and ‘the professional’ may be differently defined, 
eg in connection with tax law (see eg Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Maxse [1919] 1 KB 647; Neild v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners (No 2) [1948] 2 All ER 1071) or the international recognition of professional 
qualifications (see Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 
on the recognition of professional qualifications). 
20  These ideas were influenced by the theories of promises propounded by Raz (‘Promises in Morality and Law’ 
(1981) 95 Harv L Rev 916) and more recently by Friedrich and Southwood (‘Promises and Trust’, in 
Sheinman, H (ed) Promises and Agreement: Philosophical Essays (Oxford University Press, 2011)). I leave it 
to others to decide to what extent, if at all, the account in the text is consistent with those theories. 
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another’s benefit are performed with reasonable care, even when the task (though not the 
responsibility) is delegated to another, as is explored further in Giliker’s contribution to this special 
issue.21 
It must, however, be conceded that Stanton and other respected commentators have 
expressed sustained and powerful criticism of the concept of assumption of responsibility, arguing 
that it lacks utility—being used merely in conclusory fashion as a label to attach to situations where 
there is a duty of care of the relevant scope22--and merely obscures the considerations of policy or 
principle that are truly decisive in particular contexts.23 From this perspective, it is a fiction to regard 
the responsibility as voluntarily assumed rather than imposed by law. In Stanton’s view, the focus of 
inquiry should instead be on the specific ‘pockets’ of liability recognised by the courts in respect of 
particular professions and their incremental development in light of the policies to which the courts 
give effect within each pocket.24 
Despite this academic criticism of the concept, the courts have long regarded assumption of 
responsibility as central to the law of professional negligence and continue to recognise it as such. 
The idea was crucial to the recognition in principle of a tortious duty of care in respect of pure 
economic loss in Hedley Byrne v Heller.25 It has since been recognised as ‘the governing principle’ in 
determining whether a Hedley Byrne duty arises.26 Though Stanton has written that the concept was 
‘fatally damaged’ by the decision in Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc,27 the 
House of Lords in that case actually made explicit acknowledgement of the concept’s continuing 
utility.28 Such critical remarks as were made there and in other cases have mostly been directed at 
certain alleged implications of the assumption of responsibility analysis—that there has to be a 
conscious acceptance of a legal duty by the defendant29 or that assumption of responsibility is the 
exclusive basis for a duty of care extending to pure economic loss30—and do not warrant rejection of 
the concept altogether. Indeed, Jackson LJ has subsequently re-affirmed its centrality in our present 
context: ‘In my view, the conceptual basis upon which the concurrent liability of professional 
persons in tort to their clients now rests is assumption of responsibility.’31 
I will also admit to having reservations about Stanton’s preferred approach based on the 
identification and incremental development of ‘pockets’ of liability in the light of specific policy 
considerations. The problem with this alternative is that it gives no justification for the recognition of 
the duties of care whose breach leads to liability or for the various restrictions on their scope. It fails 
                                                          
21  Giliker, ‘Non-delegable duties and institutional liability for the negligence of hospital staff:  Fair, just and 
reasonable?’, this issue. 
22  Kit Barker ‘Wielding Occam’s Razor: Pruning Strategies for Economic Loss’ (2006) 26 OJLS 289; Keith 
Stanton ‘Professional negligence: duty of care methodology in the twenty first century’ (2006) 22 PN 134; 
Andrew Robertson and Julia Wang ‘The Assumption of Responsibility’ in Barker, K, Grantham, R, and Swain, 
W (eds), The Law of Misstatements: 50 Years on from Hedley Byrne v Heller (Hart, 2015) 
23  Kit Barker ‘Unreliable assumptions in the modern law of negligence’ (1993) 109 LQR 461. 
24  Stanton, supra n 22 at 149–50; Stanton, ‘Defining the duty of care for bank references’ (2016) 22 PN 272 at 
275. 
25  Supra n 10, especially at 486, per Lord Reid, and 529, per Lord Devlin. 
26  Henderson v Merrett, supra n 9 at 178, per Lord Goff. 
27  Stanton, supra n 22 at 149, referring to Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2007] 1 AC 
181. See also Stanton, supra n 24 at 274 (‘buried’). 
28  Supra n 27 at [4], per Lord Bingham (‘a sufficient but not a necessary condition of liability’), at [35] per Lord 
Hoffmann (‘useful guidance’), at [52] per Lord Rodger (‘very real value’), and at [83] per Lord Mance (‘on 
any view a core area of liability for economic loss’).  
29  Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 at 862, per Lord Griffiths; Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 
AC 605 at 637, per Lord Oliver. 
30  Customs and Excise v Barclays, supra n 27. 
31  Robinson v PE Jones [2012] QB 44 at [74]. 
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to provide a rational explanation for the specific aspects of the professional’s duty that make it 
distinctive. Why is it, when there is generally no liability in English law for negligent omissions, that 
the professional must take affirmative steps for the benefit of clients and others? Why is it, when 
English tort law generally excludes negligence liability for pure economic loss, that the professional’s 
duty extends to the latter’s purely financial interests? A complete analysis of the professional’s duty 
should account for its exceptional scope, which goes significantly further than the duty of care owed 
under orthodox general principles of the law of negligence. It ought also to account for the limits 
imposed on those to whom the professional owes the duty—not the world at large (like tort duties 
generally, subject to a requirement of reasonable foreseeability) but only the client and specific third 
parties. 
The concept of voluntary assumption of responsibility provides the requisite justification.32 
The professional’s duty of care is more extensive than that of persons generally—insofar as it has 
affirmative content and requires the professional to take reasonable care of the latter’s purely 
financial interests—precisely because that more extensive responsibility is voluntarily assumed 
through the invocation of professional status. Conversely, the protective scope of that duty is more 
limited than that of the duty of care arising under Donoghue v Stevenson33–-because it is owed only 
to the client, and/or (exceptionally) to a third party, and not to the world at large—and this is, again, 
precisely because it rests on the professional’s assumption of responsibility towards particular 
persons. 
Three specific objections to this approach may be considered. First, it may be objected that 
the responsibility placed on the professional is ultimately a question of law and not of the 
professional’s intentions. That is true, and has received judicial acknowledgement on many 
occasions.34 The legal concept of assumption of responsibility is objective.35 Consequently, ‘the 
question of whether a defendant has assumed responsibility is a legal inference to be drawn from 
his conduct against the background of all the circumstances of the case’.36 But that is the same 
approach as is adopted in the case of contractual liability,37 and provides no more reason to doubt 
the utility of assumption of responsibility in the law of tort than that of agreement in the law of 
contract. There is no inconsistency in saying that responsibility may be assumed in law 
notwithstanding a purported refusal to accept any responsibility at all.38 Nor that the obligations 
assumed may be prescribed by statute. Many professions are now heavily regulated and the duties 
on them are often predominately statutory, as Stanton’s own contribution to this collection 
illuminates with his customary clarity in the context of the mis-selling of financial products by banks 
and investment advisers. As he observes, breach of such duties may result in liabilities that are quite 
remarkable in terms of common law principle, as they involve strict liability for pure economic loss,39 
but it seems to me that they can be justified as a reasonable incident of the professional status 
assumed by those providing financial advice. 
                                                          
32  See also R Stevens Torts and Rights (2007) 9–14 and 33–37.  
33  [1932] AC 562. 
34  Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619 at 654, per Lord Slynn; Customs and Excise 
v Barclays, supra n 27 at [35], per Lord Hoffmann. 
35  Henderson v Merrett, supra n 9 at 181, per Lord Goff; Phelps, supra n 34 at 654, per Lord Slynn; Customs 
and Excise v Barclays, supra n 27 at [5], per Lord Bingham, and at [73], per Lord Walker. 
36  Customs and Excise v Barclays, supra n 27 at [36], per Lord Hoffmann.  
37  Ibid at [35], per Lord Hoffmann. As to the law of contract, see especially Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 
597. 
38  Smith v Bush, supra n 29. 
39  Stanton, ‘Investment Advice: the Statutory Remedy’, this issue. 
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Second, there is the risk that the concept of assumption of responsibility might be stretched 
beyond its proper limits.40 To say that a professional assumes responsibility to a client to take care of 
their financial interests would then become ‘little different from saying that a manufacturer of 
ginger beer assumes a responsibility to consumers to take care to keep snails out of his bottles.’41 
Yet, in my opinion, there is a substantial difference between the two situations because the 
manufacturer of ginger beer only owes a duty to be careful not to cause harm, and not a duty to 
confer a positive benefit, and in so doing need only take account of the interests of others in their 
person and property, and not their purely economic interests. Further, the manufacturer owes this 
duty to all those who might foreseeably suffer harm if the duty is neglected, not just to a limited 
class of persons (those to whom responsibility is assumed). The reason why the two situations are 
not always distinguished clearly is that it came to be said that, since the defendant need not 
consciously assume legal liability, what must therefore be assumed is responsibility for the task 
undertaken.42 Yet this fails to account for the exceptional nature of the professional’s duty (its 
affirmative content and extension to purely economic interests) or the special position—relative to 
the world at large—of the person for whom the task is performed and to whom the duty is owed. 
The assumption of responsibility analysis provides a rational explanation for these features of the 
professional’s duty and so serves to distinguish it from the duty of care arising under orthodox 
Donoghue v Stevenson principles.43 
Third, the assumption of responsibility analysis has been portrayed as ‘a smokescreen of 
meaningless jargon’ that hides the important questions the court must address in deciding whether 
the professional owes the claimant a duty of care.44 I admit that this is a risk—but it is not an 
inevitable consequence of using the assumption of responsibility analysis. In most cases, the tort 
duty will coexist alongside the contractual obligations in the retainer, and the question of what 
responsibility the professional assumes (tort) is answered by ascertaining what it was that the 
professional agreed (contract). Liability in such a case is concurrent in contract and tort.45 What was 
agreed by the parties may also be decisive even if there was no contract because the professional 
services were performed gratuitously.46 It is only where we are faced with a claimant who has no 
direct dealings with the professional, and is a third party to the contract of retainer (if there is one), 
that we have to go beyond the interpretative exercise of ascertaining the parties’ agreement and 
exercise a normative judgment about the scope of the responsibility assumed (if any). Here, the 
concept of assumption of responsibility loses its explanatory force and I agree entirely with Stanton 
that it is necessary to engage in a nuanced exploration of the factual context so as to identify more 
specific considerations that allow the principled development of the law in the light of relevant 
policy considerations.47 Yet too often surrogate factors of this nature are themselves so loosely 
                                                          
40  Ibid at [52], per Lord Rodger, and at [94], per Lord Mance. 
41  Ibid at [37], per Lord Hoffmann. 
42  White v Jones, supra n 12 at 273, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See also Customs and Excise v Barclays, supra 
n 27 at [93] per Lord Mance. 
43  See also A Mullis and K Oliphant, Torts (4th edn, 2011) § 5.4.1, suggesting that mutuality of relations between 
claimant and defendant may be a crucial consideration. As to mutuality, see further White v Jones, supra n 12 
at 283, per Lord Mustill. 
44  Stanton, supra n 24 at 275. 
45  Robinson v Jones, supra n 31 at [74], per Jackson LJ. 
46  Burgess v Lejonvarn, supra n 11. 
47  Stanton, supra n 24 at 274 (‘It is far more helpful to make an attempt to unpack the factual matrix which 
underlies the decisions which have been reached on this subject and to plot a way forward on the basis of what 
is found’). 
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formulated and inconsistently applied that they provide no further clarity, and Stanton’s own efforts 
to tie down the meaning of key terms deserve to be enthusiastically applauded.48 
I do not, however, regard Stanton’s approach—based on the detailed and context-sensitive 
analysis of individual cases—as inconsistent with the view that the professional’s duty of care is at a 
fundamental level based on an assumption of responsibility. Quite the opposite. The degree of 
normative judgement involved in determining the scope of the professional’s responsibility is 
something that calls for justification, and that is what the concept provides. It explains why—by way 
of exception to the general approach of English law—the professional has tortious obligations of an 
affirmative nature regarding the purely financial interests of other persons, and why such obligations 
are owed to a strictly limited class and not to all those who might foreseeably suffer detriment from 
their negligent performance. The professional’s invocation of professional status provides the reason 
for recognising these obligations, independently of the law of contract, and in appropriate cases for 
extending their benefit to third parties to the retainer, or even in the absence of any retainer at all.49 
Without a justification of this nature, we are thrown back on the empty formulas of ‘proximity’ and 
‘fairness, justice and reasonableness’ which neither provide any rationale for the exceptional nature 
of the professional’s duty nor give useful guidance as to its application.  
 
The Law of Professional Negligence in Flux 
Whether or not one accepts the argument above, it may nevertheless be agreed that the lack of 
conceptual clarity about the legal basis of the professional’s duty of care has contributed to a degree 
of instability in the law of professional negligence, which has been increased by changing 
conceptions of what professional status means in the contemporary world. A number of 
developments may be highlighted, serving as an introduction to the other contributions to this 
special issue. 
First, there has been a steady erosion of professional ‘privileges’ and the increased exposure of 
the professions to competitive market forces. This has been perhaps particularly evident in respect 
of the legal profession, with the relaxation of barriers to entry to the practice of law and of 
restrictions on business forms (so as to allow limited liability partnerships and alternative business 
structures) and external ownership. This increased competition is accentuated as new, unregulated 
or less regulated players enter the market.50 There is also a de-regulation of the professional-client 
relationship, including restrictions on the permitted forms of remuneration (eg to allow no win, no 
fee agreements or even US-style contingency fees (damages based agreements)), again with the aim 
of promoting competition.51 Yet, at the same time as there has been de-regulation of the markets in 
which professionals operate, the content of the professional’s duty has in some areas been 
subjected to new and more prescriptive regulation by statute, as Stanton’s contribution to this 
                                                          
48  See in particular his exemplary analysis of the extent to which a third party must be ‘identified’ or ‘identifiable’ 
under the test proposed in Caparo (supra n 29): Stanton, ‘Hedley Byrne v Heller: the relationship 
factor’ (2007) 23 PN 94. 
49  I do not mean by this formulation to exclude the possibility that analogous obligations might be imposed on 
non-professionals—just that the invocation of professional status provides a ‘short cut’ mechanism for 
imposing these obligations on a professional. 
50  See further R Abel, English Lawyers between Market and State: The Politics of Professionalism (OUP, 2004); 
R Lewis, ‘Structural Factors Affecting the Number and Cost of Personal Injury Claims in the Tort System’, in 
Quill, E, and Friel, RJ (eds), Damages and Compensation Culture: Comparative Perspectives (Hart 
Publishing, 2016) at 42–51.  
51  See generally Morris, ‘Deconstructing Policy on Costs and the Compensation Culture’, ibid.  
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collection illustrates in the context of the statutory obligations placed on banks and investment 
advisors, and the statutory liabilities to which they are subject.52  
A parallel issue is whether the common law should recognise new obligations incidental to 
professional status. A topical area considered here by Giliker is the extension to professionals of the 
non-delegable duties analysed recently by the Supreme Court in Woodland v Essex County Council.53 
Giliker’s specific concern is the application of the theory to the liability of hospitals in claims for 
clinical negligence, which she supports as a justified development in light of increasing institutional 
out-sourcing, including the engagement of private sector providers to deliver NHS care, which raises 
the risk of discrimination between those in the private and public sector.54 
Further, as the professions lose more and more of their privileges, questions arise about the 
privileged position of professionals in other contexts. In this special issue, Benson considers whether 
lawyers who provide their services on a conditional or contingency fee basis, and to that extent may 
be regarded as litigation funders, should continue to occupy a privileged position relative to 
professional litigation funders, who may be liable for costs if the claim they support should fail. His 
conclusion, though, is not that the lawyers should lose their ‘immunity’, but that it should be 
extended to litigation funders generally.55 
A second development is the general perception that there has been a ‘decline of 
professionalism’56 with an alleged fall in professional standards. Deregulation and the overriding 
emphasis on business efficiency are seen as threats to the quality of professional services and the 
established ethical values of the professions. This is accompanied by increased public scepticism 
towards professional authority57 and ‘expertise’ in general.58 Perhaps as a manifestation of such 
attitudes, the deference that the courts have traditionally shown towards the exercise of 
professional judgement is much less marked than before. Previously, the well-known Bolam test59 
might be seen as entailing the courts’ delegation to the professions themselves of the responsibility 
for setting required standards of professional conduct.60 But the professions are now subject to 
more robust regulation through common law liability rules than ever before. In this context, Laing’s 
contribution to this special issue discusses the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Montgomery v 
Lanarkshire Health Board,61 deciding that the Bolam test should no longer be applied to the doctor’s 
duty to advise the patient of treatment risks. The doctor’s advice duty is now to be assessed by a 
test of ‘materiality’: would a reasonable person in the patient's position be likely to attach 
significance to the risk, or is it (or ought it to be) known that the particular patient would be likely to 
attach significance to it? Laing acknowledges the boost that the decision gives to patient autonomy, 
but calls into question whether an already stretched health service can adequately meet the 
demands newly imposed by the Supreme Court. It should also be noted that the implications of the 
                                                          
52  Supra n 39. 
53  [2013] UKSC 66, [2014] AC 537. 
54  Supra n 21. 
55  Benson, ‘Liabilities of Litigation Funders’, this issue. 
56  See, with a particular focus on lawyers, Burger ‘The decline of professionalism’ (1995) 63 Fordham L Rev 
949; Rhodes ‘The Professionalism Problem’ (1998) 39 Wm & Mary L Rev 283 at 297–303. 
57  Pfadenhauer ‘Crisis or Decline? Problems of Legitimation and Loss of Trust in Modern Professionalism’ 
(2006) 54 Current Sociology 565. 
58  Notoriously, in the run-up to the Brexit referendum, the then Minister for Justice and Lord Chancellor, Michael 
Gove MP, remarked: ‘people in this country have had enough of experts’ (Henry Mance, ‘Britain has had 
enough of experts, says Gove’, Financial Times, 3 June 2016). 
59  Supra n 13. 
60  Cf Jackson, supra n 15 at 133: ‘The effect of Bolam is that, save in exceptional circumstances, each profession 
sets the standards by which its members are judged.’  
61  [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] AC 1430. 
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decision are not limited to the medical area: as Stanton discusses in his own article, the decision has 
already been applied in other professional contexts, with significant implications.62 
Lastly, there have been concerted efforts on the part of various occupational groups not 
traditionally regarded as ‘professional’ to acquire professional status.63 Passing over for now the 
issue of whether this may result in a dilution of what it means to be a professional and a loss of 
esteem, the question arises of whether the acquisition of such status impacts upon the liabilities to 
which the occupational group concerned is subject? In this special issue, the topic is pursued by 
Conaghan and Torrible with particular reference to the negligence liability of the police. Their 
conclusion is that the recently observable shift towards viewing policing as a profession adds further 
weight to arguments in favour of recognising a duty of care in relation to the core police functions of 
suppressing and investigating crime, at least in some instances.64 
 
Conclusion 
How changing ideas of professionalism have impacted and should impact on the law is a difficult 
question to which there are no unequivocal answers. Professionals still claim the possession of 
special competence and skill, but the claim lacks the exclusivity of old as competitors profess the 
same abilities and potential clients are less inclined to believe that the professional’s work is worth 
the money being charged for it. The set of professional privileges is constantly reduced as the state 
seeks to regulate more and more aspects of the services supplied and insists on the dismantling of 
barriers to competition. Such developments place in doubt the justification for subjecting 
professionals to special liability rules.65 But it is too early to suggest that the law of professional 
negligence will cease to exist as a distinct legal category. It is probably safest to conclude that there 
remains some justification for treating professionals as subject to special liability rules, but it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish their position from that of other occupational groups 
that claim the same competence and skill and invite trust in their performance of the same services, 
albeit without the same privileges that are granted to the corresponding profession. As these 
privileges dwindle further, we may anticipate a measure of assimilation in the liability rules applied 
to professional and non-professional groups competing in the provision of the same services, albeit 
with scope for differentiation to the extent that the competence and skill professed are of different 
degrees.  
 The papers in this collection offer convincing testimony to the fast pace of legal change in 
this area, highlighting particular developments of broad significance. I and the other contributors 
hope that they will be considered a fitting tribute to the enormous contribution over more than 30 
years that Keith Stanton has made to the law of professional negligence. I am pretty sure that he will 
not agree with everything that we have written, but I would like to think he will enjoy reading it. 
  
                                                          
62  Supra n 39. 
63  See especially Wilensky, 'The Professionalization of Everyone?' (1964) 70 Am J Sociology 137; Evetts, ‘The 
Sociological Analysis of Professionalism: Occupational Change in the Modern World’ (2003) 18 Int’l 
Sociology 395. 
64  Conaghan and Torrible, ‘Policing, Professionalism and Liability for Negligence’, this issue. 
65  Cf Jackson, supra n 15 at 138: ‘We may therefore be approaching the position that there is no discrete body 
of law on “professional negligence” or “professional liability” at all.’ See also Stanton ‘The Decline of Tort 
Liability for Professional Negligence’ (1991) 44 CLP 83. 
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